aBStract. -the June 2013 flood was the most severe large-scale flood in Germany, at least for the last 6 decades for which a hydrological flood severity has been calculated. Many gauges along the elbe and Danube rivers showed record water levels. the flood severity index, a measure which combines magnitude and spatial extension, is almost twice as large as the index of the august 2002 flood which has been the most expensive natural disaster for Germany to date. the enormous hydrological severity was caused by widespread and intense rainfall in combination with wet catchments due to exceptionally high rainfall in the month preceding the event. Preliminary damage estimates are in the order of 8.7 to 12 billion €. Hence, the losses seem to be lower compared to the 2002 flood (11.8 billion € for Germany). although detailed analyses have not been performed to date, it can be assumed that the investments and improvements in flood risk management since 2002 have reduced the flood risk and prevented higher damage.
I. InTroducTIon
In June 2013, several parts of central europe were hit by large-scale flooding. Particularly Southern and eastern Germany were affected, but also other countries such as austria, Switzerland, czech republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, croatia and Serbia. the flooding in Germany was caused by heavy rain persisting over several days in combination with wet catchments; a strong rainfall anomaly in May had led to very high soil moisture over large parts of Germany. almost all rivers in Germany showed high water levels. Severe flooding occurred especially along the Danube and elbe rivers, as well as along the elbe tributaries Mulde and Saale. the current preliminary economic loss estimates for Germany are in the range of 8.7 to 12 billion €. the upper number is very similar to the loss that has been caused by the extreme summer flood in august 2002 -the most expensive natural hazard experienced so far in Germany. this paper gives a short characterization of the meteorological and hydrological aspects of the June 2013 flood, summarizes the flood impact, and concludes with some impressions on the state of flood risk management in Germany.
II. Hydro-meTeoroLoGy of THe June 2013 fLood

II.1. Precipitation and initial conditions
In May and June 2013, central europe experienced several similar meteorological situations with a cut-off upper low pressure zone above Germany that moved slowly eastwards. On its eastern side, warm and moist air masses were continuously advected from the sub-tropics to northern and central europe. Several low pressure systems in succession induced long periods of widespread and intense rainfall, which was additionally enforced by orographic uplift over the low mountain ranges in Germany and the northern side of the alps. a particular feature of the June 2013 flood was the combination of high rainfall and very wet initial catchment conditions. the month of May 2013 was the second wettest May since 1881 and showed 180% of the long term monthly mean precipitation [ceDIM, 2013a] .
Figure 1 (left) shows for Germany the 30-day antecedent Precipitation Index (aPI), which is the sum of daily precipitation (1-30 May) weighted with respect to the time span to the maximum in June. Large parts of central, east and south Germany show unusually high values of aPI in May. these values are significantly higher compared to other record floods in Germany. Hence, soils were already very wet or even saturated when the flood-causing rainfall began at the end of May. Wet soils and catchments favored fast and high runoff generation.
the most intense rainfall occurred between 31 May and 4 June with a successive west-to-east shift. the maximum 7-day totals, quantified separately for each grid point as running means, confirm that the flood-triggering rainfall can be characterized by a large spatial extent, covering most parts of southern and eastern Germany, particularly the Danube and elbe catchments (Fig. 1, middle) . Highest values around 200 mm occurred over the Ore mountains (southeast of Dresden), the Black Forest mountains (west of Stuttgart), Swabian Jura (east of Stuttgart), and over the alps in Bavaria (south of Munich). Several parts of eastern Germany were additionally hit by convection and thunderstorms. extreme value statistics of maximum 7-day rainfall totals yield return periods below 50 years for most of the areas. However, several hot spots, especially over the aforementioned low mountain ranges and the alps showed return periods in excess of 200 years (not shown here).
II.2. discharge peaks
the June 2013 flood was a large-scale, trans-basin flood: all major river basins in Germany showed flooding, including the Weser, upper rhine (Main, neckar), elbe and Danube catchments. Heavily affected were the Danube and elbe rivers and some of their tributaries. For example, the city of Passau at the confluence of Danube and Inn showed a record water level of 12.75 m. this is the highest water level since the historical flood of 1501 (discharge for this historical flood is unknown). Floods of record were observed at many gauges in the Danube and elbe catchments (Figure 2 ). especially along the elbe, the maximum water levels observed since the installation of the gauges were exceeded on a river stretch of 250 km between coswig and Lenzen [BfG, 2013] . Based on the data from nine gauges, which showed record water levels along the elbe and Danube rivers, the mean observation period for discharge is 100 years (range: 78-121 years of observations). Systematic water level observations are expected to have started even earlier, hence, the values of the June 2013 flood may be record values for even longer periods.
Figure 1 (right) illustrates the hydrological extent of the June 2013 flood in terms of return periods. Several fractions of the river network in the elbe and Danube catchments were affected by flood peaks larger than the 100 year flood. More than 60% of the German river network considered was affected by flood peak discharges exceeding a statistical return period of two years.
III. fLood ImPAcTs
the extreme water levels and discharge values led to extensive inundations, including a number of flood defense failures. Large-scale inundations occurred as consequence of dike breaches near Deggendorf (Danube), Groß rosenburg (Saale) and Fischbeck (elbe). additionally, a considerable number of smaller dike breaches leading to less extensive inundations areas was recorded, e.g., 5 breaches at the elbe river in Saxony, and 19 dike breaches at the Mulde river [BfG, 2013] .
First estimates of total economic damage amount to 8.7 to 12 billion € for Germany alone [Die Bundesregierung, 2013 , Fitch ratings, 2013 , GdV, 2013 . a special reconstruction aid fund of 8 billion € has been implemented by the federal states and the German federal government (aufbauhilfegesetz came into effect on 19 July 2013), to cope with the flood impacts. the insurance industry estimated 180.000 damage claims summing up to 2 billion € insured damages [GDV, 2013] .
More than 52.000 people had to be evacuated during the June 2013 floods. Further, it claimed 8 lives in Germany, and the total number of fatalities in all affected countries was 25. the German Farmers' association estimated that 250.000 hectares of grasslands and crop fields were inundated. Large industrial companies, e.g., Porsche aG in Leipzig, Volkswagen aG in zwickau or Südzucker aG in zeitz, had to stop their production due to direct flood effects or indirect effects as consequence of supply chain disrup- tions. In total, from 31 May to 4 June, traffic disruptions on federal roads ("Bundesstraße") and highways occurred in 89 German districts ("Landkreis") [ceDIM, 2013b] . to understand the hydrological severity of the June 2013 flood, we compare it with the set of trans-basin floods for Germany for the period 1952-2002 compiled by uhlemann et al. [2010] . they proposed two measures for comparing trans-basin floods: L is defined as the percentage of the German river network affected by at least a 2-year flood, and the overall event severity S is derived as the sum of weighted peak discharges, normalized by the median annual flood, whereas the weights are the ratios of the river stretch length associated with a certain gauge to the total length of the river network. Hence, S is an index for the overall event severity considering both the heterogeneous spatial extent as well as the locally varying magnitudes of trans-basin floods. In total, uhlemann et al. It is particularly interesting to compare the impacts of the two floods in 2002 and 2013. the current, preliminary damage assessments estimate at most the same economic loss for both floods, although the June 2013 flood was much more severe in hydrological terms. although there are no detailed studies available yet, the comparable (or even reduced) loss may be the outcome of significant improvements in flood risk management during the last ten years. the 2002 flood has triggered comprehensive risk reduction measurements, such as • massive investments in structural flood defense, e.g., Saxony alone invested more than 500 million € since 2002 in structural defense measures [Bröker, 2013] , • the 5-point-programme of the German federal government to improve precautionary flood protection measures [BMu, 2003] 
IV. comPArIson To oTHer LArGe-scALe fLoods
V. concLusIons
the June 2013 flood was, in hydrological terms, the most severe flood in Germany, at least for the last 6 decades for which a hydrological flood severity has been calculated. the enormous hydrological severity was caused by widespread and intense rainfall on very wet soils due to exceptionally high rainfall in the month preceding the event. although the hydrological severity of the flood 2013 is at least twice as high as the severity of the flood 2002, the damages in 2013 are expected to be significantly lower than in 2002 -in particular taking into account the inflation effect which would raise the damages of 2002 to approximately 15 billion € [ceDIM, 2013b] . Generally, it is assumed that the improvements in flood risk management since 2002 have prevented higher damage. However, detailed investigations are necessary to support this assumption.
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